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Lifting the Curtain
Opening a Preliminary Examination at the International Criminal
Court
Rosemary Grey and Sara Wharton
Abstract
In the emerging literature on preliminary examinations, most scholars have focussed on issues that arise
after a preliminary examination has been opened. Yet there has been little analysis of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor’s decision to open a preliminary examination in the first place. Taking
this gap in the literature as our starting point, and flagging an emerging debate in the ICC as to whether
the Rome Statute envisages a ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage at all, this article examines the law and
policy which governs the opening of an ICC preliminary examination and makes the case for further critical
discussion about how actions by the Prosecutor and the Court at this early stage of proceedings might
affect perceptions of the legitimacy of the ICC. We argue that the Prosecutor’s power to open a preliminary
examination can involve complex legal questions, have significant political consequences, and affect how
independent the Court is, and is seen to be. As an initial contribution to what we hope will be a broader
conversation on this topic, we suggest that greater transparency about the Prosecutor’s decision-making
at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage, and greater consistency in the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)’s
treatment of different situations, would enhance the legitimacy of the Court, so long as the OTP continues
to protect the safety and security of those who send information on alleged crimes.

1. Introduction
On 8 February 2018, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced that she
had started to analyse information on alleged crimes in the Philippines and Venezuela.1 The very
next day, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte threatened to withdraw from the Rome Statute of
the International Criminal Court, claiming: ‘There are so many massacres happening in all parts
of Asia and you pick on me. You better clear that up because I will withdraw from the ICC.’2 True
to his word, on 17 March 2018, Duterte sent the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General written
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ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on opening
Preliminary Examinations into the situations in the Philippines and in Venezuela, 8 February 2018, available online
at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208-otp-stat (visited 3 September 2019).
2
Press Conference of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte, Republic of the Philippines, Presidential Communications
Operations Office, 9 February 2018, available online at https://pcoo.gov.ph/press_briefing/press-conferencepresident-rodrigo-roa-duterte/ (visited 3 September 2019). Translation: ‘Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte says
he cannot be tried by war crimes court’, New Indian Express, 9 February 2018, available online at
http://www.newindianexpress.com/world/2018/feb/09/philippines-president-rodrigo-duterte-says-he-cannot-betried-by-war-crimes-court-1770887.html (visited 3 September 2019).
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notice of the Philippines’ decision to withdraw from the Rome Statute.3 In accordance with the
Statute, this decision will become effective in one year’s time.4 The Philippines will then become
the second state to withdraw from the ICC, following Burundi, whose withdrawal became effective
on 27 October 2017 — a development described by the presidential spokesperson as a ‘great
victory’ over a court which had become an ‘instrument in the hands of the West to enslave African
states’.5
These withdrawals were not provoked by the issuance of arrest warrants against
government officials, or even the start of an ICC investigation per se. Rather, they were provoked
by the initiation of a ‘preliminary examination’; an exercise of prosecutorial power deemed so
insignificant by the Rome Statute’s drafters that it rates just a single mention in the Statute.6 As a
result of the lack of a detailed statutory framework for opening a preliminary examination, several
parts of this process take place with little or no legal guidance. Twenty years since the creation of
the ICC, the lack of legal guidance on this point is starting to look like significant oversight given
the complex legal issues that can arise during or prior to the instigation of a preliminary
examination, and because of the significant political consequences that a decision to open a
preliminary examination can have.7 Even more so now, given the emerging debate as to when a
‘preliminary examination’ actually begins — a question raised by the proceedings regarding the
alleged deportation of Rohingya people from Myanmar.8
The Office of the Prosecutor’s (OTP’s) current practice of formally announcing and
publicizing the opening of new preliminary examinations, as well as the tide of reports on
ICC, ICC Statement on The Philippines’ notice of withdrawal: State participation in Rome Statute system essential
to
international
rule
of
law,
20
March
2018,
available
online
at
https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1371 (visited 3 September 2018).
4
Art. 127(1) ICCSt.
5
‘Burundi becomes first nation to leave international criminal court’, The Guardian, 28 October 2017, available online
at https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/oct/28/burundi-becomes-first-nation-to-leave-international-criminal-court
(visited 3 September 2018); ‘UN commission: Burundi commits crimes against humanity’, Al Jazeera, 5 September
2017, available online at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/commission-burundi-commits-crimes-humanity170904133352582.html (visited 3 September 2018).
6
Art. 15(6) ICCSt.
7
For example, the ICCSt. stipulates that in the absence of a referral from a State Party or the Security Council, the
Prosecutor cannot proceed from a preliminary examination to an investigation without obtaining authorization from
the Pre-Trial Chamber of the Court. This requirement for judicial authorization was written into the Statute to alleviate
the fears of states who were concerned about the prospect of a rogue Prosecutor using his or powers to initiate
‘politically motivated’ proceedings. See A.M. Danner, ‘Enhancing the Legitimacy and Accountability of Prosecutorial
Discretion at the International Criminal Court’, 97 American Journal of International Law (AJIL) (2003) 510-552.
8
See ICC, Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”
(ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-37), 6 September 2018, §§ 81-82 (‘Myanmar/Bangladesh Decision’) & Partially dissenting
opinion of Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, § 13 (‘Myanmar/Bangladesh Partial Dissent’).
3
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preliminary examinations that the OTP now publishes, suggests that the importance of this early
stage of proceedings is not lost on Prosecutor Bensouda. Most recently, the caution that the OTP
has shown in requesting a ruling on jurisdictional questions raised in the context of alleged crimes
against the Rohingya people in Myanmar and Bangladesh suggests that it is acutely aware that a
decision to open a preliminary examination, and the interpretation of the ICC’s jurisdictional
requirements at this early stage of proceedings, can have high stakes.9 The importance of
preliminary examinations is also increasingly recognized in academic literature, with several
scholars and non-government organisations (NGOs) arguing that preliminary examinations can
have consequences beyond the possible initiation of an investigation by the ICC, such as catalysing
domestic proceedings, or engendering domestic law reform.10 The significance of the preliminary
examination process has been clearly articulated by Carsten Stahn who observes:

Although they are at the periphery of the formal judicial process, [preliminary examinations] have a key role
to play in relation to the legitimacy and perception of justice. Preliminary examinations are related to certain
retributive rationales, such as prevention of violations and reaffirmation of norms. They also have certain
distributive effects. They frame choices on resource allocation and distribution of blame, i.e. who should be
investigated and prosecuted internationally. They provide incentives to domestic jurisdictions to address
accountability dilemmas. Moreover, they have a strong expressivist dimension. They express harm and
gravity of alleged violations and set important signals about the type of atrocity situations that international
criminal justice cares about.11

Yet in the emerging literature on preliminary examinations, most scholars have focussed on issues
that arise after a preliminary examination has been opened, such how long the preliminary

ICC, Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute (ICC-RoC46(3)-01/181), OTP, 9 April 2018, § 1 (‘Myanmar/Bangladesh Request’); Decision assigning the “Prosecution’s Request for a
Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute” to Pre-Trial Chamber I (ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-2), President
of the Pre-Trial Division, 11 April 2018.
10
E.g. D. de Vos, Complementarity’s Gender Justice Prospects and Limitations – Examining normative interactions
between the Rome Statute and national accountability processes for sexual violence crimes in Colombia and the
Democratic Republic of Congo (PhD Thesis, European University Institute, 2017); A. Kapur, ‘The Value of
International-National Interactions and Norm Interpretations in Catalysing National Prosecutions of Sexual Violence’,
6 Oñati Socio-Legal Series (2016); Human Rights Watch, Pressure Point: The ICC’s Impact on National Justice
(2018), available online at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/ij0418_web_0.pdf (visited 3 September
2018).
11
C. Stahn, ‘Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Challenges and Critiques of Preliminary Examinations at the
ICC’, 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice (JICJ) (2017) 413-434, at 415-416.
9
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examination should take,12 and how the statutory criteria for opening an investigation have been
interpreted at the preliminary examination stage.13 By contrast, there has been little analysis of the
political and legal consequences of a decision to open a preliminary examination in the first place,
and the process that leads up to that exercise of prosecutorial power — a process that has no name
in the Rome Statute or ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, but which we will call the ‘prepreliminary examination’ stage.
Taking this gap in the literature as our starting point, this article examines and makes the
case for further critical discussion about the law and policy which governs the opening of an ICC
preliminary examination and the ‘pre-preliminary’ stage. We argue that these early deliberations
warrant closer attention from scholars, lawyers, states, and all of those with an interest in the Court,
because it can involve complex questions about the ICC’s jurisdictional boundaries, can have
significant political consequences including prompting withdrawals, and can affect how
independent the Court is, and is seen to be. Motivating this analysis is a curiosity about where a
decision to open a preliminary examination fits into the broader debate about the ICC’s legitimacy
— both in terms of its ‘right to rule’, as understood from the perspective of legal theorists, and its
perceived legitimacy, as understood by the local and global polities watching the Court. 14 We
suggest that greater transparency and consistency in the Office’s decision-making at this early
stage of proceedings would enhance the perceived legitimacy of the Court by making decisionmaking more accountable and, potentially, more participatory, so long as the Office continues its
practice of protecting the identity of individuals that send it information on alleged Rome Statute
crimes.15
A. Pues, ‘Towards the ‘Golden Hour’? A Critical Exploration of the Length of Preliminary Examinations’, 15 JICJ
(2017) 435-453.
13
M. Longobardo, ‘Everything Is Relative, Even Gravity: Remarks on the Assessment of Gravity in ICC Preliminary
Examinations, and the Mavi Marmara Affair’, 14 JICJ (2016) 1011-1030; D. Bosco, ‘Discretion and State Influence
at the International Criminal Court: The Prosecutor’s Preliminary Examinations’, 111 AJIL (2017) 395-414; L.
Chappell, R. Grey and E. Waller, ‘The Gender Justice Shadow of Complementarity: Lessons from the International
Criminal Court’s Preliminary Examinations in Guinea and Colombia’, 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice
(2013) 455–475.
14
For a discussion of these two conceptions of legitimacy, often described as ‘normative’ and ‘sociological’
legitimacy, see: A. Buchanan and R.O. Keohane, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, 20 Ethics and
International Affairs (2006), 405-437; H.G. Cohen, A Føllesdal, N. Grossman and G. Ulfstein, ‘Legitimacy and
International Courts – A Framework’, in N. Grossman, H.G. Cohen, A Føllesdal and G. Ulfstein, Legitimacy and
International Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 1-40; L. Chappell, The Politics of Gender Justice at the
International Criminal Court: Legacies and Legitimacy (Oxford University Press, 2016), 19-23.
15
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, rule 46; OTP, Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations, November 2013
(‘Policy
Paper’),
§
88,
available
online
at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otppolicy_paper_preliminary_examinations_2013-eng.pdf (visited 13 September 2018).
12

4

To frame this argument, Part Two of the article examines the law and policy that governs
a decision to open a preliminary examination (as distinct from the host of decisions that follow).
This section is quite brief because, as we will show, decision-making at this early stage of
proceedings occurs with little guidance from law or policy. However, it makes the point that
prosecutorial decision-making at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage includes making
decisions of a legal nature (namely, decisions on jurisdiction), as well decisions of a discretionary
nature, meaning ‘choos[ing] between two or more permissible courses of action’.16 In Part Three,
we explore the OTP’s practice in this respect, organising our observations into what is known about
decisions to open a preliminary examination, and what remains ambiguous or unknown. This
review spans fifteen years of practice, starting with the opening of a preliminary examination into
the situations in Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Côte d’Ivoire in 2003. Part Four
offers some ideas for making this area of the OTP’s practice more consistent and transparent, and
considers how the Court (i.e., the Chambers) might support the OTP in this respect. Bringing the
article to a close, Part Five identifies some questions for further research and debate.

2. Law and Policy
The process for opening a preliminary examination occurs with little guidance from law or policy.
To begin with the law, the starting point is Article 13 of the ICC Statute which provides that the
ICC can exercise jurisdiction in any of three scenarios: when a situation is referred to the
Prosecutor by a State Party; when a situation is referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security
Council; or if the Prosecutor ‘has initiated an investigation in respect of such a crime in accordance
with article 15.’ It is there, in Article 15, that we find the first and only reference to a ‘preliminary
examination’ in the ICC Statute.
Read together, Articles 13 and 15 indicate that the Prosecutor must conduct an analysis of
available information before an investigation can begin; that this early stage of analysis is called a
‘preliminary examination’; and, if it was initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu (on his or her
own motion), then a Pre-Trial Chamber must give permission before the Prosecutor can progress
to an ‘investigation’ as such.17 While this statutory framework offers a general definition of what

16

See Danner, supra note 7, 518.
The only reference to a ‘preliminary examination’ in the ICCSt. appears in Art. 15(6), which regulates the initiation
of an investigation by the Prosecutor proprio motu. One might therefore argue that there is no need for a preliminary
examination when the investigation is instead initiated by a referral from a State Party or the UN Security Council.
17
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a ‘preliminary examination’ is, it leaves unanswered several key questions about the process by
which the Prosecutor decides whether or not to open a preliminary examination in the first place.
In particular, the Statute does not specify any circumstances in which the Prosecutor is obligated
to take this step, nor set forth any criteria for the Prosecutor to apply when sorting between
situations that warrant the initiation of a preliminary examination and those that do not.
By contrast, the decision to open an ‘investigation’ is a highly regulated affair. In order to
open an investigation, the Prosecutor must apply the criteria found in Article 53(1) of the Rome
Statute, meaning that he or she must determine whether or not there is a reasonable basis to believe
that crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC have been committed, that the potential cases would
be admissible (meaning that they would be sufficiently grave to justify further action by the ICC
and are not already the subject of genuine national proceedings), and that an investigation would
serve the ‘interests of justice’.18 Article 53(1) further specifies that, if the situation was referred by
a State Party or the Security Council, the Prosecutor ‘shall’ (must) initiate an investigation unless
any of these tests of ‘jurisdiction’, ‘admissibility’, and ‘interests of justice’ is not satisfied.19 If
there was no such referral, then the Prosecutor must convince a Pre-Trial Chamber that these three
tests are satisfied before an investigation can commence.20 Additional rules govern a decision to
open an investigation into the crime of aggression21 for which the ICC’s jurisdiction was activated
on 17 July 2018. If the Prosecutor decides that there is not a reasonable basis to open an
investigation, that decision is subject to a degree of judicial oversight (albeit minimal).22 By

However, Art. 53(1) ICCSt. and Rule 48 RPE specify that the Prosecutor must determine whether the criteria of
jurisdiction’, ‘admissibility’, and ‘interests of justice’ are satisfied before initiating an investigation into any situation,
regardless of the initiating mechanism. A preliminary examination is therefore necessary in all situations, not just
those in which the proceedings are initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu. It has been argued that the ICC Statute is
‘wrong’ to require a preliminary examination in the case of a Security Council referral. However, the Court has not
adopted that view: it has allowed the Prosecutor to conduct preliminary examinations (albeit brief ones) into both
situations that have been referred by the UN Security Council to date. See J.D. Ohlin, 'Peace, Security, and
Prosecutorial Discretion', in C. Stahn and G. Sluiter (eds), The Emerging Practice of the International Criminal Court
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008), 186-208.
18
Art. 53(1) ICCSt. Rule 48 RPE.
19
Art. 53(1) ICCSt.
20
Art. 15(3)-(4) ICCSt,
21
Art. 15bis ICCSt..
22
Art. 53(3)(a) ICCSt. provides that, if the Prosecutor’s decision not to open an investigation is based on the criteria
of ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘admissibility’, and if situation was referred by a State Party or the Security Council, then the PreTrial Chamber may review the Prosecutor’s decision at the referring party’s request and, on the basis of that review,
may request the Prosecutor to reconsider his or her decision. We note that judicial review under this provision is
limited in three ways. First, the Pre-Trial Chamber is not obligated to review the Prosecutor’s decision if the referring
party so requests. Second, if the Pre-Trial Chamber elects to review the Prosecutor’s decision and identifies an error
therein, it cannot compel the Prosecutor to reconsider; the most it can do is ‘request’ that the Prosecutor takes that
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contrast, the Statute is silent about whether the Prosecutor’s decision on whether or not to open a
preliminary examination is subject to judicial oversight at all.23
In the absence of clear statutory framework for opening a preliminary examination, the
OTP has developed its own Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations (‘the Policy’), which was
made public in November 2013. While policy papers are, of course, not binding, it provides the
greatest insight into the OTP’s approach to preliminary examinations, in particular in light of the
limited statutory guidance on this issue. The Policy outlines four ‘phases’ of analysis that the OTP
conducts before any investigation can begin. Phases 2, 3 and 4 are fairly straightforward and focus
on the Article 53(1) criteria that the Prosecutor applies during a preliminary examination in order
to determine whether or not there is a reasonable basis to open an investigation (namely, the
aforementioned tests of ‘jurisdiction’; ‘admissibility’ and ‘interests of justice’).24 However, it is
‘Phase 1’ which is the most relevant for our purposes. According to the Policy:

Phase 1 consists of an initial assessment of all information on alleged crimes received under article 15
(‘communications’). The purpose is to analyse and verify the seriousness of information received, filter out
information on crimes that are outside the jurisdiction of the Court and identify those that appear to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Court. Specifically, the initial assessment distinguishes between communications
relating to: a) matters which are manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court; b) a situation already under
preliminary examination; c) a situation already under investigation or forming the basis of a prosecution; or
d) matters which are neither manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court nor related to situations already
under preliminary examination or investigation or forming the basis of a prosecution, and therefore warrant
further analysis.25

step. Third, if the Prosecutor chooses to review the decision, he or she is not obligated to reach a different outcome.
By contrast, Art. 53(3)(b) provides that, if the Prosecutor’s decision not to open an investigation was based solely the
‘interests of justice’ criteria, the Pre-Trial Chamber can overrule that decision, either at the request of the referring
party or on its own motion. This is the only true judicial review power that the Chambers have over the OTP’s decision
making at the preliminary examination phase.
23
When faced with this issue, one Pre-Trial Chamber used the judicial review provisions under Art. 53(3) of the
Statute to resolve the question. See Decision on the 'Request for review of the Prosecutor's decision of 23 April 2014
not to open a Preliminary Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the
Registrar's Decision of 25 April 2014', Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court (ICCRoC46(3)-01/14-3), Pre-Trial Chamber II, 12 September 2014.
24
Policy Paper, supra note 15, §§ 81-83.
25
Ibid., § 78. See also A. Khojasteh, ‘ICC Statute Article 15’, 13 June 2017, available online at
https://www.cilrap.org/cilrap-film/15-khojasteh/ (visited 3 September 2018).

7

Communications in the last category, i.e. those that ‘warrant further analysis’, are then examined
in a ‘dedicated analytical report which will assess whether the alleged crimes appear to fall within
the jurisdiction of the Court and therefore warrant proceeding to the next phase’.26 The preparation
of this report is all part of the ‘Phase 1’.
As a foundation for the forthcoming analysis, there are four key points about the ‘Phase 1’
process to be noted here. First, ‘Phase 1’ is not part of the preliminary examination; it is a prepreliminary examination stage.27 Second ‘Phase 1’ does not apply to situations that have been
referred by a State Party or the Security Council, or which are the subject of an ad hoc declaration
by a non-State Party accepting the jurisdiction of the ICC (an ‘Article 12(3) declaration’).28 Rather,
those situations jump straight to ‘Phase 2’, meaning that a preliminary examination is formally
opened without prior screening by the OTP.29 This disparate treatment of situations that have been
referred or identified in Article 12(3) declarations versus other situations that the Prosecutor may
be asked to investigate by civil society or other actors is not mandated by the Statute. Rather, it is
a choice that the Prosecutor has made — not unlawfully but, as we suggest later, not very fairly
— in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Third, both ‘Phase 1’ and ‘Phase 2’ deal with the
issue of jurisdiction. This raises questions about the distinction between these two stages, which
we return to in our discussion of the OTP’s practice, below. Fourth, the entire ‘Phase 1’ process
can occur behind closed doors. The Statute does not obligate the Prosecutor to notify the Pre-Trial
Chamber, or any third party, of any conclusions reached at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’
stage. Thus, if the Prosecutor finds that a situation is ‘manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the
Court’, the reasons for this decision, or even the bare fact that the decision has been made, need
not be disclosed or publicised in any form.

3. From Policy to Practice
A. Phase 1: Key Facts and Figures
While the OTP’s Policy lays down a framework for opening a preliminary examination, a thorough
understanding of this stage of proceedings requires an analysis of the Office’s practice in reviewing
Article 15 communications. The term ‘Article 15 communications’ refers to information on alleged

26

Ibid., § 79.
The Policy Paper specifies that a preliminary examination’s ‘formal commencement’ occurs at Phase 2. Ibid., § 80.
28
Ibid., §§ 75-76.
29
Ibid., § 80.
27
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crimes that is sent by individuals or organizations to the ICC Prosecutor in accordance with Article
15 of the Rome Statute. These communications may be sent before a preliminary examination has
been opened and may, depending on the conclusions reached at ‘Phase 1’, prompt the Prosecutor
to open a preliminary examination proprio motu. They may also be submitted after a preliminary
examination has been opened, in which case they could potentially supplement the information
that the Prosecutor has already received and/or solicited under Article 15(2).
The OTP receives a vast number of these communications in a single year, all of which are
subjected to a ‘Phase 1’ analysis in accordance with the Policy. Data provided by the Office gives
a sense of the scale of this task. As of 31 October 2017, the OTP had received 12,590 Article 15
Communications, 568 of which were received in the period between 1 October 2016 and 31
October 2017 alone.30 In general, it receives approximately 400 to 600 communications every
year.31 However in one anomalous period (1 August 2008 and 30 June 2009), the Office received
4870 communications.32 3,823 of these pertained the conflict in South Ossetia, Georgia,33 all but
six of those being submitted by the Prosecutor General of Moscow34 — a striking fact, and one
that has not garnered much attention in the scholarship on the Court.
In accordance with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the OTP does not publicly
identify the sender as a general rule.35 However, pursuant to its Policy and its Regulations, the
Office may publicly confirm receipt of a communication if the sender has already made public that
fact.36 There have been relatively few instances in which the Office has followed this course of
action in practice. One example is the aforementioned barrage of communications from the

OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2017, 4 December 2017 (‘2017 Preliminary Examination
Report’), § 18, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/2017-PE-rep/2017-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf
(visited 3 September 2018).
31
The number of Art. 15 communications received annually are reported in the OTP’s annual reports on preliminary
examinations. Other numbers can be found in the Court’s reports to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP) and to the
UN General Assembly.
32
ICC, Report of the International Criminal Court, UN General Assembly, Sixty-fourth session, 17 September 2009,
Un Doc. A/64/356 (‘2009 UN Report’), § 44.
33
Ibid.
34
The ICC’s 2009 report to the General Assembly notes that: ‘The Prosecutor General of Moscow, whose State is not
a party to the Statute, has sent 3,817 communications to the Court’. However, the report does not specify the time
period in which these 3,817 communications were received. Ibid., § 48.
35
Rule 46 provides that: ‘Where information is submitted under article 15, paragraph 1, or where oral or written
testimony is received pursuant to article 15, paragraph 2, at the seat of the Court, the Prosecutor shall protect the
confidentiality of such information and testimony or take any other necessary measures, pursuant to his or her duties
under the Statute.’
36
Policy Paper, supra note 15, § 88; Regulations of the OTP, reg. 28.
30
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Prosecutor General of Moscow, which the Office acknowledged in a 2009 report.37 Another is the
communication from two civil society groups that, in 2014, prompted Prosecutor Bensouda to
‘reopen’ the preliminary examination into allegations of crimes by UK forces in Iraq (see Part 3.D,
below). Aside from these and a handful of other examples,38 the OTP does not generally publicise
receipt of an ‘Article 15 communication’ or identify the sender. However, as we discuss in more
detail below, some senders have chosen to publish their communications of their own accord.39
The number of Article 15 communications varies from one situation to another. Excluding
the anomaly of the thousands of communications in the situation in Georgia, reported numbers of
communications per preliminary examination vary from only seven or eight in situations like South
Korea40 and Central African Republic II41 to 125 communications relating to the situation in
Afghanistan,42 131 communications relating to the situation in Nigeria,43 199 communications
relating to the situation in Colombia,44 and over 240 communications reportedly received in
relation to the Iraq/UK preliminary examination.45 In most cases, the OTP continues to receive
communications most years even after a preliminary examination has been opened.46

37

2009 UN Report, supra note 32.
Other examples include the report of the Independent Fact-Finding Committee on Gaza, which the OTP reports
having received from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States in 2009; and a communication submitted by
the Palestinian Minister for Foreign Affairs in June 2015, six months after the second preliminary examination in
Palestine had been opened. See: Report of the International Criminal Court to the United Nations for 2007/8, UN
Doc. A/64/356, 17 September 2009, § 51; OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015 (12 November
2015), § 74, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf (visited 3 September
2018).
39
See also M. Fairlie, ‘The Hidden Costs of Strategic Communications for the International Criminal Court’, 51 Texas
International Law Journal (2016) 281-320; S. Williams, ‘Civil Society Participation in Preliminary Examinations’,
Quality Control in Preliminary Examination, Torkel Opsahl Academic EPublisher (forthcoming).
40
OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2013, November 2013 (‘2013 Preliminary Examination
Report’)
§
103,
available
online
at
https://www.icccpi.int/itemsDocuments/OTP%20Preliminary%20Examinations/OTP%20%20Report%20%20Preliminary%20Examination%20Activities%202013.PDF (visited 3 September 2018).
41
OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2014, 2 December 2014, (‘2014 Preliminary Examination
Report’), § 194, available online at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-Pre-Exam-2014.pdf>.
42
2017 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 30, § 230.
43
Ibid., § 204.
44
Ibid., § 121.
45
OTP, Response to communications received concerning Iraq, 9 February 2006 (‘2006 Iraq Response’), 1, available
online at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf (visited 3
September 2018).
46
For example, the OTP had reported receiving a total of 86 communications relating to the situation in Colombia in
its first annual report on preliminary examinations published in 2011 (although some were outside of the Court’s
jurisdiction), § 61. Since then, the number of article 15 communications in relation to the situation in Colombia has
gone up by an average of 19 new communications per year: OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2011,
13 December 2011 (‘2011 Preliminary Examinations Report’), § 61, available online at https://www.icccpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/63682F4E-49C8-445D-8C1338
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As noted above, the OTP sorts incoming Article 15 communications into four groups:
communications relating to crimes that are ‘manifestly’ outside the ICC’s jurisdiction;
communications relating to existing preliminary examinations; communications relating to
existing investigations or prosecutions; and communication which ‘warrant further analysis’. The
majority of ‘Article 15 Communications’ (70-85% in most years) relate to allegations that are
found to be ‘manifestly’ outside the jurisdiction of the Court at Phase 1.47 Some relevant article 15
communications contain information on new situations and, thus, require evaluation for the
purposes of determining whether or not to open a new preliminary examination. However, many
communications in more recent years relate to ongoing preliminary examinations or investigations.
In the OTP’s most recent report on its preliminary examination activities, it recorded a
slightly higher rate of potentially relevant article 15 communications than average (39%).48
Numbers published in recent OTP reports show that generally, in the past few years, only a few
dozen potentially relevant49 article 15 communications require analysis relating to potentially new
preliminary examinations for the Office, namely: 21 out of 597 (3.5%) in 2013;50 44 out of 579
(7.6%) in 2014;51 42 out of 502 in 2015 (8.4%);52 and 28 out of 477 (5.9%) in 2016.53 Again, the
OTP’s 2017 Preliminary Examination Report recorded a higher rate of communications warranting
further analysis than previous years, namely 62 out of 568 (10.9%).54
F310A4F3AEC2/284116/OTPReportonPreliminaryExaminations13December2011.pdf (visited 3 September 2018);
OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2012, November 2012 (‘2012 Preliminary Examination Report’),
§
97,
available
online
at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/C433C462-7C4E-4358-8A728D99FD00E8CD/285209/OTP2012ReportonPreliminaryExaminations22Nov2012.pdf (visited 3 September 2018);
2013 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 40, § 118; 2014 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 41, §
103; OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2015, 12 November 2015 (‘2015 Preliminary Examination
Report’), § 136, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-PE-rep-2015-Eng.pdf (visited 3
September 2018); OTP, Report on Preliminary Examination Activities 2016, 14 November 2016 (‘2016 Preliminary
Examination Report’), § 231, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/161114-otp-rep-PE_ENG.pdf
(visited 3 September 2018); 2017 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 30, § 121.
47
For example, in its first report to the ASP, the OTP noted that, from July 2002 to 8 July 2003, it received 499
communications, over 70 per cent of which ‘manifestly fell outside of the current subject-matter jurisdiction of the
Court’ ICC, Report of the International Criminal Court, 6 August 2003, ICC-ASP/2/5, (‘2003 Report to ASP’), § 32.
Similar numbers can be seen in the most recent annual preliminary examination reports, e.g. 2013 Preliminary
Examination Report, supra note 40, § 16; 2015 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, § 18; 2017
Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 30, § 18.
48
2017 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 30, § 18.
49
‘Potentially relevant’ meaning those not filtered out as ‘manifestly outside the Court’s jurisdiction’. See, e.g., 2014
Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 41, § 18.
50
2013 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 40, § 16.
51
2014 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 41, § 18.
52
2015 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, § 18.
53
2016 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, § 18.
54
2017 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 30, § 18.
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B. Preliminary Examinations that have been opened
Consistent with the Policy, the OTP has opened a preliminary examination into every situation
that has been referred by a State Party or the Security Council (see Table 1, below). It has also
opened an investigation in all but one of these situations: a striking correlation, but one which we
will not examine here.55 It is also the OTP’s policy to open a preliminary examination into every
situation that is the subject of an Article 12(3) declaration, as noted above. However, the OTP’s
practice in this regard has not been entirely consistent. The first declaration was made by Côte
d'Ivoire and was received on 1 October 2003, at which time current ICC accused Laurent Gbagbo
was President.56 The preliminary examination was opened at that point.57 The next declaration was
the 22 January 2009 declaration by the Palestinian National Authority, which purported to accept
the ICC’s jurisdiction since 1 July 2002.58 Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo opened a preliminary
examination upon receipt of that declaration in January 2009, but subsequently closed the
preliminary examination on 3 April 2012 because Palestine was not yet recognised as a ‘state’ by
the UN General Assembly and, therefore, its Article 12(3) declaration was invalid.59 Prosecutor
Bensouda has since opened two further preliminary examinations on receipt of Article 12(3)
declarations: the declaration by Ukraine on 7 April 2014 which accepted the ICC’s jurisdiction
from 21 November 2013 to 22 February 2014;60 and the declaration made by Palestine on 1 January

55

For a discussion of this pattern, see Bosco, supra note 13. The exception to this pattern is the situation regarding
the registered vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia, which was referred to the Prosecutor by the Union of
Comoros on 14 May 2013. See Notice of Prosecutor’s Final Decision under Rule 108(3), Situation on the registered
vessels of the Union of Comoros, the Hellenic Republic and the Kingdom of Cambodia (ICC-01/13-57), Pre-Trial
Chamber I, 29 November 2017.
56
, Situation in the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”,
OTP, 23 June 2011, ICC-02/11-3, § 15.
57
Ibid. The 2003 declaration was ‘reconfirmed’ in December 2010, following Alassane Ouattara’s victory in the
November 2010 presidential election. In May 2011, Ouattara sent Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo a letter emphasising
the ‘obstacles’ to prosecuting the crimes committed in the ensuring post-election crisis in domestic courts. The OTP
‘thus continued to analyse the situation in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly the violence following the [2010] presidential
runoff’, and subsequently sought authorization to open an investigation in June 2011. See 2011 Preliminary
Examination Report, supra note 46, §§ 120-121 (emphasis added).
58
2012 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, § 196; Report of the International Criminal Court to the
United Nations for 2008/9, UN Doc. A/64/356, 17 September 2009, § 51.
59
2012 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, § 201-202.
60
2015 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, § 77-79. Note: On 8 September 2015, Ukraine made a second
Article 12(3) declaration which accepted the Court’s jurisdiction from 20 February 2014 onwards.
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2015 (which by then attained ‘non-member observer State’ status in the General Assembly) which
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction from 13 June 2014.61
A contrasting example can be seen in the OTP’s response to the Article 12(3) declaration
submitted on 13 December 2013 by the Freedom and Justice Party of Egypt, i.e. the party of former
Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, who was toppled by a coup d'état in July 2013. The
declaration was received by the ICC Registrar, but the OTP declined to open a preliminary
examination because the Freedom and Justice Party lacked the requisite authority to make
declarations on behalf of Egypt and, as a result, the declaration was invalid.62 Morsi and his party
sought a review of that decision, but the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the decision was not subject
to judicial review.63 The Egypt example is similar to the first Palestine example: in both instances
the OTP found that the ICC’s preconditions to jurisdiction were lacking because there was no
consent, in the form of a valid Article 12(3) declaration, from a relevant state.64 Yet in relation to
Palestine, this decision was made three years after a preliminary examination was opened, whereas
in relation to Egypt, it was made before a preliminary examination even begun.
Collectively, Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo and Prosecutor Bensouda have opened fifteen
preliminary examinations proprio motu without an Article 12(3) declaration. For some of these
preliminary examinations the OTP has explicitly stated that they were opened on the basis of
Article 15 communications. For others, this information is not available.65 The list includes the
preliminary examination in the Democratic Republic of Congo66 and the second preliminary

61

Palestine made an Article 12(3) declaration on 1 January 2015, and became a State Party to the ICCSt the following
day. Palestine subsequently referred the situation to the Prosecutor for investigation on 22 May 2018. The OTP has
confirmed that the Prosecutor opened the preliminary examination 16 January 2015 on the basis of the Article 12(3)
declaration. See OTP, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, opens a preliminary
examination of the situation in Palestine, 16 January 2015, available online at https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1083 (visited 3 September 2018).
62
ICC, The determination of the Office of the Prosecutor on the communication received in relation to Egypt, 8 May
2014, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1003 (visited 3 September 2018).
63
Decision on the 'Request for review of the Prosecutor's decision of 23 April 2014 not to open a Preliminary
Examination concerning alleged crimes committed in the Arab Republic of Egypt, and the Registrar's Decision of 25
April 2014', Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court, (ICC-RoC46(3)-01/14-3), Pre-Trial
Chamber II, 12 September 2014.
64
In the absence of a Security Council referral, the ICC can only exercise jurisdiction where the conduct is committed
on the territory of an ICC State Party or a state that has made an Article 12(3) declaration, or if the alleged crimes
were committed by a national of such states. See ICCSt, Article 12(2) and (3).
65
Theoretically, the OTP could open a preliminary examination proprio motu on the basis of open source information
but it is not clear whether or not the OTP has ever done so.
66
On 19 April 2004, the DRC referred the situation in its territory to the ICC Prosecutor: ICC, Report of the
International Criminal Court, UN Doc A/62/314, 31 August 2007, §10. On 23 June 2004, the OTP issued a statement
announcing Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo’s decision to open an investigation into the situation in the DRC. The
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examination in the Central African Republic (CAR),67 which were opened by the Prosecutor
proprio motu in 2003 and 2012 respectively, prior to the ‘post hoc referrals’ by those states.68 It
also includes the preliminary examination in the ‘Iraq/UK situation’ (relating to crimes allegedly
committed by UK forces in Iraq), which was first closed in 2006 and then ‘re-opened’ in 2014, the
preliminary examination in the ‘situation in Afghanistan’ (relating to crimes allegedly committed
in Afghanistan and in CIA-operated facilities in Lithuania, Poland and Romania), and the
preliminary examinations into crimes allegedly committed on the territories of Burundi, Colombia,
Georgia, Guinea, Honduras, Kenya, Nigeria, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and (in two
separate situations) Venezuela.69 Disaggregated by the regional categories used by the UN,70 this
list of preliminary examinations is relatively diverse: it includes crimes allegedly committed in six

statement did not identify a starting date for the preliminary examination; but it noted that the Office ‘has been closely
analyzing the situation in the DRC since July 2003, initially with a focus on crimes committed in the Ituri region.
[Prior to the referral,] [i]n September 2003 the Prosecutor informed the States Parties that he was ready to request
authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to use his own powers to start an investigation, but that a referral and active
support from the DRC would assist his work’. It can be therefore be surmised that the OTP conducted a preliminary
examination in this situation, and made a decision to proceed to an investigation, prior to the DRC’s referral. See:
ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court opens its first investigation, 23 June 2004,
available
online
at
https://www.icccpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=the+office+of+the+prosecutor+of+the+international+criminal+court+opens+its+first
+investigation (visited 3 September 2018).
67
On 7 February 2014, the OTP announced its decision to open a preliminary examination in a ‘new’ situation in the
CAR. Subsequently, on 30 May 2014, the transitional government of CAR referred the situation in the CAR since 1
August 2012 to the OTP. See: OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda,
on opening a new Preliminary Examination in Central African Republic, 7 February 2014, available online at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-statement-07-02-2014 (visited 3 September 2018); 2014
Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 41, § 191.
68
The ICCSt. does not provide a term for a scenario in which, after the Prosecutor has initiated a preliminary
examination proprio motu pursuant to Art. 15(1), a State Party then refers that same situation to the ICC pursuant to
Art. 14 (thereby removing the need for the Prosecutor to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber before an
investigation can commence). We refer to such referrals as ‘post hoc referrals’.
69
The first ‘Venezuela’ preliminary examination, which has been closed, related to crimes allegedly committed by
the Venezuelan government and associated forces, and by opposition groups, prior to 9 February 2006. The second
‘Venezuela’ preliminary examination, which is ongoing, concerns crimes allegedly committed in this state ‘since at
least April 2017, in the context of demonstrations and related political unrest.’ See: OTP, OTP response to
communications received concerning Venezuela, 9 February 2006, available online at https://www.legaltools.org/doc/c90d25/pdf/ (visited 3 September 2018); ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal
Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on opening Preliminary Examinations into the situations in the Philippines and in
Venezuela, 8 February 2018, available online at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=180208-otp-stat
(visited 3 September 2018).
70
UN Department for General Assembly and Conference Management, United Nations Regional Groups of Member
States, (undated), available online at http://www.un.org/depts/DGACM/RegionalGroups.shtml (visited 3 September
2018).
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African states,71 four Asia-Pacific states,72 four Eastern European states,73 three Latin American
states,74 and encompasses several crimes allegedly perpetrated by nationals from the ‘Western
European and Others’ bloc, namely, nationals of the USA and UK.75

71

These six states are Burundi, the CAR, the DRC, Guinea, Kenya, and Nigeria.
These four states are Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, and the Republic of Korea.
73
This includes the preliminary examination into the situation in Georgia, and the preliminary examination into the
situation in Afghanistan, which includes crimes allegedly committed in Lithuania, Poland, and Romania. See: Public
redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”, 20 November 2017, ICC02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (ICC-02/17-7-Red 20-11-2017), Pre-Trial
Chamber III, 20 November 2017, §§ 49, 51, 189, 249.
74
These three states are Colombia. Honduras, and Venezuela.
75
The ‘Afghanistan’ preliminary examination includes crimes allegedly committed by members of the US armed
forces and the CIA; the ‘Iraq/UK’ preliminary examination includes crimes allegedly committed by members of the
British harmed forces; and the second Palestine situation (‘Palestine II’), as well as the situation on the registered
vessels of Comoros, Cambodia, and Greece (the ‘Comoros situation’), both include crimes allegedly committed by
Israeli nationals. See: Public redacted version of “Request for authorisation of an investigation pursuant to article 15”,
20 November 2017, ICC-02/17-7-Conf-Exp, Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (ICC-02/17-7-Red 2011-2017), Pre-Trial Chamber III, 20 November 2017, § 4; 2014 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 41, §§
246-269; 2015 Preliminary Examination Report, supra note 46, §§ 23-76.
72
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Table 1: Preliminary examinations opened by the OTP
Situation

Trigger for PE

Year PE opened

Prosecutor’s decision

1

Uganda76

State Party referral

2003

Proceed to investigation

2

CAR I

2004

Proceed to investigation

3

Mali

2012

Proceed to investigation

4

Comoros

2013

Not to proceed to investigation

5

Gabon

2016

Decision pending

6

Sudan

2005

Proceed to investigation

7

Libya

2011

Proceed to investigation

8

Côte d'Ivoire

2003

Proceed to investigation

9

Palestine I

2009

Not to proceed to investigation

10

Ukraine

2014

Decision pending

11

Palestine II77

2015

Decision pending

12

DRC78

2003

Proceed to investigation

13

Colombia

2004

Decision pending

14

Iraq/UK

2006 or prior; ‘re-opened’ 2014

Decision pending

15

Venezuela

2006 or prior

Not to proceed to investigation

16

Kenya

2007

Proceed to investigation

17

Afghanistan et al.

2007 or prior

Proceed to investigation79

18

Georgia

2008

Proceed to investigation

19

Guinea

2009

Decision pending

20

Republic of Korea

2010

Not to proceed to investigation

21

Nigeria

2010

Decision pending

22

Honduras

2010

Not to proceed to investigation

23

CAR II80

2014

Proceed to investigation

24

Burundi

2016

Proceed to investigation

25

Venezuela II

2018

Decision pending

26

Philippines

2018

Decision pending

UNSC referral

Prosecutor propio
motu following
Art. 12(3)
declaration

Prosecutor propio
motu following
Art. 15
communications

The ICC website says that the situation in Uganda was referred to the ICC in ‘January 2004’, available online at
https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda (visited 3 September 2018). However, court records cite the referral date as 16
December 2003. See, e.g. ICC, Decision on the confirmation of charges, Ongwen (ICC-02/04-01/15-422-Red), PreTrial Chamber II, 23 March 2016, § 4.
77
This preliminary examination was initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu in response to Palestine’s Article 12(3)
declaration of 1 January 2015. Palestine subsequently made a post hoc referral on 22 May 2018 (see note 60).
78
This preliminary examination was initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu in approximately June 2003. The DRC
subsequently made a post hoc referral on 19 April 2004 (see note 65).
79
As of 31 July 2018, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision on whether or not to authorize this investigation is pending.
80
This preliminary examination was initiated by the Prosecutor proprio motu on 7 February 2014. The CAR
subsequently made a post hoc referral on 30 May 2014 (see note 66).
76
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C. Blurring of Phase 1 and Phase 2
If the Prosecutor decides not to open a preliminary examination in response to an Article 15
communication, there is no legal duty to notify the Court, the public, or the sender of that fact.
Yet, information that senders post online, as well as information obtained directly from senders,
indicates that the OTP has chosen to notify senders of a decision not to proceed.81 The responses
that we analysed in researching this article, albeit a small sample, suggest that the line between a
preliminary examination and a ‘pre-preliminary examination’ has not always been clear in
practice.
For example, on 13 September 2011, the US-based Center for Constitutional Rights sent
Prosecutor Moreno Ocampo an 84-page submission, plus 20,000 pages of supporting material, on
alleged ‘pervasive and serious sexual violence against children and vulnerable adults by priests
and others associated with the Catholic church’.82 The Center argued that the alleged sexual abuse
met the Rome Statute’s definition of crimes against humanity, and that it was attributable to highlevel Vatican officials under Articles 25(3)(c), (d) and 28(b) of the Rome Statute.83 In a brief letter
dated 31 May 2013, the OTP summarised the criteria for opening an investigation (i.e. the criteria
found in Article 53(1) of the Statute), and advised the Center that, based on the information that
the Center provided and other readily available information, ‘the matters described in your
communication do not appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court’. More specifically:
Some of the allegations described in your communication do not appear to fall within the Court’s temporal
jurisdiction, and other allegations do not appear to fall within the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The
Prosecutor has therefore determined that there is not a basis at this time to proceed with further analysis.

Pursuant to Regulation 28(1) of the Regulations of the Office of the Prosecutor, ‘The Office shall send an
acknowledgement in respect of all information received on crimes to those who provided the information.’ The
regulations impose no such requirement about informing senders of any subsequent decision not to open a preliminary
examination into the relevant matter. 23 April 2009, ICC-BD/05-01-09.
82
Centre for Constitutional Rights, Victims’ Communication Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute Requesting
Investigation and Prosecution of High-level Vatican Officials for Rape and Other Forms of Sexual Violence as Crimes
Against Humanity and Torture as a Crime Against Humanity, 13 September 2011, § 1, available online at
http://nationbuilder.s3.amazonaws.com/snap/pages/795/attachments/original/FINALSNAPWORD.pdf?1315913668
(visited 3 September 2018).
83
Ibid, §§ 193-196.
81
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However, the information you have submitted will be maintained in our archives, and the decision not to
proceed may be considered in light of new facts or information.84

This could be interpreted to mean that a preliminary examination was opened, and was then
discontinued because the first criteria for opening an investigation (namely, that there is a
‘reasonable basis to believe that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been or is being
committed’) is not satisfied. 85 Yet the Office does not classify the situation described in the
Center’s communication as a preliminary examination that has been ‘closed’, indicating that the
analysis described in the above letter took place before any preliminary examination began.86 For
us, this example illustrates the difficulty of distinguishing the initial jurisdictional analysis that the
OTP conducts prior to a preliminary examination (i.e. ‘Phase 1’) from the jurisdictional analysis
it conducts once a preliminary examination is underway (i.e. ‘Phase 2’). It appears that both phases
deal with fairly complex jurisdictional questions, and both involve an analysis of information
contained in the Article 15 communication in conjunction with other sources. The distinction
seems to be the standard of proof: at ‘Phase 1’, the Office is asking whether or not the crimes are
‘manifestly’ outside the Court’s jurisdiction, whereas at ‘Phase 2’, it is applying a ‘reasonable
basis’ test. The line here is fine and, in practice, it is not clear that the situations deemed to fall
short of the Phase 1 standard necessarily fell ‘manifestly’ outside the jurisdiction of the Court.
The ambiguity between ‘Phase 1’ and ‘Phase 2’ is further illustrated in the responses to
two communications regarding the Australian government’s widely-criticised treatment of asylum
seekers who enter Australian waters by boat,87 the first of which was sent in October 2014 by an

84

OTP, Letter from the Office of the Prosecutor (ICC Ref, OTP-CR-159/11), 31 May 2013, available online at
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/snap/pages/795/attachments/original/1372188351/ICC_letter_from_Prosecuti
on.pdf?1372188351 (visited 3 September 2018).
85
ICCSt, Art. 53(1)(a).
86
The Office has identified four preliminary examination which were opened and subsequently closed without an
investigation, namely, the preliminary examinations in Honduras, on the Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and
Cambodia, the Republic of Korea, and the first preliminary examination in Venezuela. See: ICC, ‘Preliminary
Examinations’,
available
online
at:
https://www.icccpi.int/pages/pe.aspx#Default=%7B%22k%22%3A%22%22%7D#eb04684c-1c88-48c8-9ed5aeba105c7014=%7B%22k%22%3A%22%22%7D) (visited 3 September 2018).
87
E.g. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Concluding observations on the fifth periodic report of
Australia, UN Doc. E/C.12/AUS/CO/5, 11 July 2017, §§ 17-18; Australian Human Rights Commission, The Forgotten
Children: National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention (2014).
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Australian member of parliament,88 and the second of which was sent by a coalition of legal experts
assembled by the International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic of Stanford Law
School in February 2017.89 The OTP’s response to both communications was the same. It stated:

The Office is analyzing the situation identified in your communication, with the assistance of other related
communications and other available information. Under Article 53 of the Rome Statute, the Prosecutor must
consider whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court have
been committed, the gravity of the crimes, whether national systems are investigating and prosecuting the
relevant crimes, and the interests of justice … . As soon as a decision is taken on whether there is a reasonable
basis to proceed with an investigation, we will advise you promptly and we will provide reasons for the
decision.90

This response seems to suggest that the situation is the subject of an ongoing preliminary
examination, and that the Office is in the process of determining whether or not to proceed to the
next stage (an investigation). However, the OTP’s most recent preliminary examination report
makes no reference to the situation regarding Australia’s treatment of asylum seekers, which
indicates that the matter has not progressed to Phase 2, ‘which represents the formal
commencement of a preliminary examination’,91 but is still at Phase 1 – a position that the OTP
confirmed in June 2017.92 Given these ambiguities, it is positive that the Office has indicated that
future correspondence with article 15 senders will be more comprehensive and detailed.93
The ambiguity between Phase 1 and Phase 2 is perhaps best illustrated by the ongoing
proceedings regarding events in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The proceedings arise from a request
made by the Prosecutor in April 2018, which seeks a judicial opinion on whether or not the ICC
could theoretically exercise jurisdiction in relation to the ‘alleged deportation of the Rohingya

88

A. Wilkie, Letter to the ICC Prosecutor, 22 October 2014, available online at http://andrewwilkie.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/10/First-Letter-to-the-ICC.pdf (visited 3 September 2018).
89
J. Cavallaro, D. Shamas, B. Van Schaack, et al., Communiqué to the Office of the Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court Under Article 15 of the Rome Statute: The Situation in Nauru and Manus Island: Liability for Crimes
Against Humanity, sent on 14 February 2017, available online at https://law.stanford.edu/publications/communiqueto-the-office-of-the-prosecutor-of-the-international-criminal-court-under-article-15-of-the-rome-statute-thesituation-in-nauru-and-manus-island-liability-for-crimes-against-humanity/ (visited 3 September 2018).
90
Letter dated 25 November 2014 and 11 April 2017 (on file). Cited with the permission of the addressees.
91
Policy Paper, supra note 15, § 80.
92
See Khojasteh, supra note 25.
93
Ibid.
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people from Myanmar into Bangladesh’.94 Some may suggest that the alleged deportation would
not to fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction because the situation Myanmar has not ratified the Rome
Statute or made a declaration under Article 12(3), nor has the Security Council referred the
situation to the Court. However, the OTP argues that the situation does fall within the Court’s
jurisdiction because part of the relevant conduct occurred in Bangladesh, which is a State Party to
the Rome Statute.95
On 6 September 2018, the majority of the Pre-Trial Chamber accepted that argument regarding
the ICC’s territorial jurisdiction.96 However, the Chamber rejected the OTP’s claim that the current
proceedings precede the opening of a preliminary examination into the situation in Myanmar and
Bangladesh: in its view, the ICC’s legal texts ‘do not envisage a pre-preliminary examination
stage’, and the Prosecutor’s actions of receiving information and assessing whether jurisdiction
exists ‘do not precede a preliminary examination, but are part of it, whether formally announced
or not’.97 In a partially dissenting opinion, Judge Perrin de Brichambaut declined to answer the
jurisdictional question on the basis that the Court has no power to decide such questions at this
‘embryonic stage’ of proceedings,98 that a judicial decision at this early stage would amount to ‘a
de facto advisory opinion’,99 and that rendering such decisions ‘might allow the Prosecutor to
circumvent the procedures otherwise applicable, delay her decision-making, or even shift the
burden of assembling a case onto the Pre-Trial Chamber.’100

The fact that the OTP has come to the view that the ICC could prosecute the alleged
deportation of Rohingya people from Myanmar to Bangladesh, and asked the Chamber to ‘verify’
that position,101 indicates that it has completed the jurisdictional analysis that it describes as ‘Phase
1’ Moreover, the Pre-trial Chamber has ruled, by a majority, that this preliminary examination is

94

See Myanmar/Bangladesh Request, supra note 9, § 1.
In the OTP’s words: ‘The coercive acts relevant to the deportations occurred on the territory of a State which is not
a party to the Rome Statute (Myanmar). However, the Prosecution considers that the Court may nonetheless exercise
jurisdiction under article 12(2)(a) of the Statute because an essential legal element of the crime - crossing an
international border - occurred on the territory of a State which is a party to the Rome Statute (Bangladesh).’ Ibid, §
2 (emphasis original).
96
Myanmar/Bangladesh Decision, supra note 8.
97
Ibid, § 82 (emphasis added).
98
Myanmar/Bangladesh Partial Dissent, supra note 8, § 5
99
Ibid, § 4,
100
Ibid, § 13.
101
Ibid, § 4.
95
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already underway. Yet in the OTP’s view, no preliminary examination has begun. For us, this
scenario exemplifies the difficulty in distinguishing between Phase 1 and Phase 2.

D. Decision-making Behind Closed Doors
As a result of the OTP’s decision to publish its 2013 Policy Paper on Preliminary Examinations
and to issue regular reports and public statements on its preliminary examination activities,
information about this once-mysterious stage of ICC proceedings is increasingly available to
interested individuals, organisations, and states. However, some significant information gaps
remain. We will highlight three illustrate examples here.
First, the date of the Prosecutor’s decision to open certain preliminary examinations is
unknown. These days, when the Prosecutor opens a preliminary examination, it is the OTP’s
practice to make a public announcement to that effect.102 However, in its earlier practice, the Office
did not always announce the start of the preliminary examination or specify that date in subsequent
public documents. As a result, the starting date for some early preliminary examinations, including
the initial preliminary examinations in Venezuela103 and Iraq,104 is unknown.
Second, for most of the preliminary examinations that the OTP has initiated proprio motu,
the source(s) of information on which the Office’s decision was based remain unknown. The
Office has only once specified which sources it relied on when deciding to open a preliminary
examination. That was in May 2014, when Prosecutor Bensouda announced her decision to ‘re-

102

E.g. ICC-OTP, Statement of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, on opening a
Preliminary Examination into the situation in Burundi, 25 April 2016, available online at https://www.icccpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?name=otp-stat-25-04-2016 (visited 3 September 2018); ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor of
the International Criminal Court, Mrs Fatou Bensouda, on opening Preliminary Examinations into the situations in
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open’ the preliminary examination into crimes allegedly committed by UK nationals in Iraq on the
basis of a January 2014 communication from the European Center for Constitutional and Human
Rights and Public Interest Lawyers as the catalyst for re-opening this preliminary examination.105
In the other fourteen examples, the information that prompted the Prosecutor to open a preliminary
examination is unknown. Even at a general level, it is unknown in some cases whether the decision
was based on Article 15 communications, or on open access information, or a combination of the
two.106
Third, there is very little data on Article 15 communications that did not result in a
preliminary examination. Although the OTP has published some general statistics about
communications that were filtered out at Phase 1 (see above), there is almost no information on
the subject matter of those communications, or the reasons that they were filtered out. The
explanation provided in the OTP’s reports, namely that the information is manifestly ill-founded
or that the alleged crimes fell ‘manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court’, covers a vast range
of possibilities: it could mean that the ICC’s preconditions to jurisdiction are not satisfied;107 that
the alleged crimes fall outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction;108 that the Court is lacking subject
matter jurisdiction for any reason, including that the contextual elements for war crimes, crimes
against humanity or genocide are not established;109 that the Office does not regard the underlying
105
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acts as crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC;110 that certain ‘special intent’ requirements are
not established;111 or simply that the information is manifestly ill-founded and has no air of reality
to the allegations. Thus, beyond stating that there was a problem of jurisdiction (as opposed to
admissibility, or the ‘interests of justice’), the OTP’s reports shed little light on why the vast
majority of Article 15 communications are filtered out at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage.
Against this backdrop, it is significant to note some recent developments in which the OTP
has been more forthcoming about its reasoning and legal analysis at the ‘pre-preliminary
examination’ stage. For example, in April 2015, the Prosecutor made a public statement explaining
why, despite receiving numerous communications about crimes allegedly committed by the socalled Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), she had concluded that ‘the jurisdictional basis for
opening a preliminary examination into this situation is too narrow at this stage.’112 Moreover, on
9 April 2018, the Prosecutor took the unprecedented step of seeking a judicial ruling on a complex
jurisdictional question regarding alleged deportation into a State Party before a preliminary
examination has been opened. This request, which offers a rare glimpse into the OTP’s decisionmaking at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage, is discussed in more detail below.

4. Enhancing Legitimacy
Having outlined the OTP’s practice in opening preliminary examinations in detail above, there are
three points that stand out as requiring further research and discussion in and around the Court
with a view to enhancing the legitimacy of the Court by increased consistency, transparency, and
communication in the OTP’s ‘pre-preliminary examination’ activities.

A. Consistency
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The first point relates to the OTP’s policy of putting some situations, but not others, through a
‘pre-preliminary examination’ process. From a workload perspective, the fact that the Office has
found a way to cull situations before opening a preliminary examination makes sense. As Fairlie
has observed, the process of sifting through Article 15 communications is a major undertaking.113
Taking the next step and actually opening a preliminary examination into every situation described
in these communications would be untenable, especially in years where the number of
communications is unusually high. Thus, the Office is justified in developing a triage system to
manage this process. However, we suggest that there should be further discussion about whether
the OTP is justified, normatively and politically, in creating a shortcut for situations identified in
channels that are only available to states, namely, referrals and Article 12(3) declarations, as
distinct from situations identified in Article 15 communications.
To explain: as a matter of policy, the first group of situations (those described in referrals
or declarations) proceed automatically to ‘Phase 2’, meaning that they are given the status of a
‘preliminary examination’ regardless of the strength of the jurisdictional arguments in the situation
at hand.114 By contrast, the second group of situations (those described in Article 15
communications) go through a ‘Phase 1’ analysis, and the vast majority are filtered out at that
stage. As the OTP recognises, this differential treatment of Article 15 communications as
compared to referrals and declarations is a policy decision, rather than something expressly
required by the Rome Statute.115 We do not suggest that this policy decision is unlawful. However,
from a normative perspective, it is open to critique. This is because Article 15 communications
can be sent by anyone, but referrals and declarations can only be made by states, either
independently or as members of the UN Security Council. Thus, as a consequence of the OTP’s
policy, states (or, more specifically, incumbent governments, including permanent members of the
Security Council who have chosen not to ratify the Rome Statute) have a greater say in where the
ICC operates — insofar as preliminary examinations are concerned — than organizations or
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individuals who may wish to hold those governments to account. This has negative implications
for how independent the Court is seen to be, and how independent it actually is, from the interests
of states.
Some may argue that states and the Security Council are given a privileged provision in
the Statute over civil society members or other non-state actors by virtue of the fact that an
investigation may be opened on the basis of a state party or Security Council referral without any
judicial oversight. However, it is important to recall that the reason that a role was given to the
Pre-Trial Chamber in overseeing investigations opened proprio motu was to provide a measure of
oversight over the Prosecutor (due to the fear of a ‘rogue’ or ‘politically-motivated’ Prosecutor),
and not a comment on the role that civil society and other non-state actors could play in providing
information to the Prosecutor for the purposes of initiating an investigation.116
Of course, the OTP’s policy has practical benefits, if certain conditions are met – namely,
if the referral or declaration comes from a state with jurisdiction over the alleged crimes. Where
such a state ‘invites’ the OTP in, this increases the likelihood that the state will cooperate with the
ICC, may enable smoother investigations (particularly if it is the state with territorial jurisdiction
over the alleged crimes), and decreases the risk of states withdrawing if a preliminary examination
is opened, as Burundi and the Philippines have done. However, any such benefits, even if they
may arise, should not be determinative of the Prosecutor’s decision on whether or not a preliminary
examination is opened. The Prosecutor is required to be independent and impartial. Their role is
not to make decisions that are convenient but to ensure that the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community are investigated and prosecuted in accordance with the law. 117 That
conception of prosecutorial independence sits uncomfortably with a policy which differentiates
between requests from states versus civil society at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage. As
the late Christopher Hall has written, ‘[t]he Court was not to be simply a passive institution, simply
waiting for the Security Council, States parties and Article 12(3) States or others to seize the
Court.’118
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For these reasons, we suggest that it would seem more legitimate for the OTP’s ‘Phase 1’
filtering process to apply to all situations, including referrals and Article 12(3) declarations, rather
than only to Article 15 communications as the current policy states. This is unlikely to overburden
the Office, given that the number of referrals and declarations is demonstrably lower than the
number of communications under Article 15. However, it would make the Court more impervious
to attacks on the Prosecutor’s independence, which is particularly necessary in a climate where
threats of withdrawals are no longer just ‘talk’.

B. Transparency
As detailed above, ‘Phase 1’ and ‘Phase 2’ of the preliminary examination process both address
questions of jurisdiction, but are (at least theoretically) distinguishable by the applicable standard
of proof. But there is another distinction between these two phases: whereas decisions at Phase 1
generally take place out of the public eye, decisions at Phase 2 are explained in the annual
preliminary examination reports and other interim reports published by the OTP. The Prosecutor’s
request for a ruling on jurisdictional questions in relation to Myanmar/Bangladesh, a situation
which is currently at Phase 1, represents a step forward in this respect. The question raised by the
OTP has implications beyond the situation in Myanmar/Bangladesh. 119 From a transparency
perspective, it is positive that the request has been made, and is publicly accessible. Theoretically,
the OTP could have made the request immediately upon opening a preliminary examination, at the
start of Phase 2. However, according to the Prosecutor, it was important to take this step prior to
opening a preliminary examination in order to avoid creating expectations of an ICC intervention
or allocating resources to further analysis before the OTP would be confident that the ICC would
agree that the situation falls within the jurisdiction of the Court.120
The OTP’s decision to refer this question to the Court at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’
stage is a departure from its previous practice. As noted in the OTP’s request,121 a similar legal
question arose in the (now closed) preliminary examination into alleged war crimes committed on
For example, applying the argument made in the OTP’s Myanmar request, the Global Legal Action Network has
argued that if Israel executes its reported plan to forcibly deport Eritrean and Sudanese asylum seekers to Uganda, this
could potentially amount to a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the ICC because Uganda is a State
Party to the ICCSt. See K.J. Heller, ‘A Letter to Israel About Its Plans to Forcibly Deport Africans’, Opinio Juris, 15
April 2018, available online at http://opiniojuris.org/2018/04/15/a-letter-to-israel-about-its-plans-to-forciblyrepatriate-africans/ (visited 3 September 2018).
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South Korean islands and vessels. However, in that instance, the Office did not request a
jurisdictional ruling by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Instead, it took the view that, although the alleged
crimes commenced on the territory of a non-State Party (North Korea), they were completed in a
State Party (South Korea) and, therefore, satisfied the pre-conditions to jurisdiction found in
Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute.122 The Office’s new approach is more transparent than the
previous practice of making potentially far-reaching conclusions about contentious jurisdictional
questions without external input or judicial oversight. This shift to transparency is laudable, even
if as a result of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision of 6 September 2018, the OTP must acknowledge
that a preliminary examination is ‘open’ before further requests of this nature can be made.
By contrast, the Pre-Trial Chamber’s handling of the matter has been quite opaque. 123 It
has given Bangladesh and Myanmar the opportunity to submit public or confidential observations
on what is ostensibly a pure question of law,124 an offer that Bangladesh took up by filing
confidential observations on 11 June 2018 (and which Myanmar declined),125 scheduled a closed,
Prosecutor-only status conference to discuss the request, and declined to invite amicus curiae
submissions on the matter in line with the example set by the ICC Appeals Chamber in the Al
Bashir case.126 Most concerning, it did not put in place any mechanism to guarantee that the
122

OTP, Situation in the Republic of Korea Article 5 Report, June 2014, § 39 (see note 17 therein), available online
at: https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/sas-kor-article-5-public-report-eng-05jun2014.pdf (visited 3 September 2018).
123
For other commentaries on the closed nature of these proceedings, see J. O’Donohue, ‘Transparency is essential if
the ICC is to convincingly resolve the question of its jurisdiction over forced deportations from Myanmar’, Human
Rights in International Justice, 20 June 2018, available online at https://hrij.amnesty.nl/transparency-essential-iccjurisdiction-forced-deportations-myanmar/ (visited 3 September 2018); K.J. Heller, ‘PTC I’s Problematic Closed, Ex
Parte Hearing on the Myanmar Situation’, Opinio Juris, 14 May 2018, available online at
http://opiniojuris.org/2018/05/14/33572/ (visited 3 September 2018); A. Whiting, ‘Process as well as Substance is
Important in ICC’s Rohingya Decision’, Just Security, 15 May 2018, available online at
https://www.justsecurity.org/56288/process-substance-important-iccs-rohingya-decision/ (visited 3 September 2018).
124
Decision Inviting the Competent Authorities of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh to Submit Observations
pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on
Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court (ICCRoC46(3)-01/18-3), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 7 May 2018, § 7; Decision Inviting the Competent Authorities of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar to Submit Observations pursuant to Rule 103(1) of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence on the “Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute”, Request under
Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court (ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-28), Pre-Trial Chamber I, 21 June 2018, § 6.
125
See: ICC, Transcript of Ex Parte Status Conference (ICC-RoC46(3)-01-18-T-1-Red-ENG), page 14, line 7;
Observations on behalf of victims from Tula Toli, Request under Regulation 46(3) of the Regulations of the Court
(ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-26), Legal Representative of Victims, 18 June 2018, § 6; Government of the Republic of the
Union of Myanmar, Ministry of the Office of the State Counsellor, Press Release (9 August 2018), available online
at
https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/PRESS%20RELEASE%20_%20Myanmar%20President%20
Office.pdf (visited 6 September 2018).
126
Order inviting expressions of interest as amici curiae in judicial proceedings (pursuant to rule 103 of the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence), Al Bashir (ICC-02/05-01/09-330), Appeals Chamber, 29 March 2018. We note that this

27

putative victims would be represented in the proceedings (the vast majority of Rohingya people
are stateless, and therefore, not represented by either of the two governments whose opinion the
Chamber sought). In short, the Chamber has kept much of the process in the dark. It has ultimately
taken proactive submissions from lawyers representing two groups of putative victims127 and
similar initiatives by civil society groups, five of whom have been granted leave to submit amicus
curiae observations,128 to ensure that a broader range of voices are heard. Nonetheless, this
approach to judicial proceedings, we suggest, is not a model for transparent, accountable, and
inclusive decision-making at the ‘pre-preliminary examination’ stage.

C. Public Communication of Results
As explained above, while the Office now publishes statistics about how many communications it
receives in a given year and how many are filtered out at ‘Phase 1’, this information is of a very
general nature. For researchers, the lack of information about the subject matter of Article 15
communications, the identity of the senders, and the reasons that the majority of communications
are deemed ‘manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court’ impedes clear and accurate
commentary on the OTP’s preliminary examination and ‘pre-preliminary examination’
activities.129 Moreover, from the perspective of individuals and organisations who are seeking to
catalyse an ICC investigation, the inability to review and compare previous successful and
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unsuccessful Article 15 communications poses a challenge. For these reasons, it seems that there
is a public benefit in more detailed, specific information from the OTP in this regard.
Of course, this public benefit must be balanced against the need to protect senders of Article
15 communications, or any third parties, from risk. As discussed above, the OTP has a legal duty
to protect the confidentiality of information received under Article 15. However, this duty does
not preclude the Office from publicizing summarized and de-identified data on the senders of
Article 15 communications. Indeed, the OTP did precisely that in its early practice to some degree.
For example, in 2003, the Office reported that had received 499 communications ‘from 66 different
countries, of which 23 per cent originated in non-State Parties.’130 However, the OTP no longer
includes this level of detail in its public reports. We suggest that a return to the Office’s past
practice of publishing this type of data would be helpful in giving some insight into who seeks to
‘use’ the Court. For example, the OTP could report on the percentage of communications from
civil society organisations, individuals, and state officials, including whether it originates in state
parties or non-state parties, as well as a breakdown by continent.
Similarly, the Office’s duty to protect the confidentiality of information received under
Article 15 would not preclude some more specific information on the reasons that the bulk of
communications are filtered out at Phase 1. In its early practice, the OTP gave more specific details
as to why jurisdiction was ‘manifestly’ lacking.131 By contrast, in its more recent reporting, the
OTP has not elaborated on its conclusions in this regard.132 Again, this is an area where the Office
could resuscitate and build on its past reporting practices. In particular, the reason of ‘falling
manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court’ would be more meaningful if divided into subcategories, such as ‘manifestly outside the Court’s temporal jurisdiction’, ‘manifestly outside the
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction’, ‘pre-conditions for jurisdiction not met because the alleged
crimes were neither committed on the territory of a state that has accepted ICC’s jurisdiction nor
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by the nationals of such states’, ‘pre-conditions for jurisdiction not met because referring entity
was not a ‘state’, inter alia.
Additionally, when no security risk is posed to the communication sender or third parties,
senders can and should make such communications public. If the sender discloses their identity
and the information contained in the communication, the Prosecutor no longer needs to maintain
the sender’s confidentiality and can release more information publically if, for example, the
communication does in fact lead to the opening of a preliminary examination. On the other hand,
if the communication does not lead to the opening of a preliminary examination, the Prosecutor’s
response and any reasons given therefor can be made public by the sender. All of this will help
contribute to greater transparency and a greater expectation of transparency from the OTP.133
These would be small but positive steps in the direction of the ICC being what Glasius calls ‘a
communicative court’ and, thereby, enhancing its legitimacy.134

5. Conclusion
It is increasingly recognized that ‘preliminary examinations are in fact one the most powerful
policy instruments of the OTP’.135 In this article, we have focussed on one aspect of this ‘powerful
policy instrument’ that has received little attention to date, namely the decision to open a
preliminary examination in the first place. In calling for greater attention to this stage of
proceedings, our intention has not been to over-state the significance of the event of opening a
preliminary examination; we recognise that is just the first of many steps that must be taken before
an accused appears in the courtroom. However, we suggest that the decision on whether or not to
open a preliminary examination is more legally complex, politically contentious, and more
relevant to perceptions of the ICC’s legitimacy than was envisaged by the drafters of the Rome
Statute or is appreciated in the literature on the Court. Indeed, speaking for ourselves, our own
estimation of the importance of this decision has grown as a result of several developments that
occurred during our research process, including the withdrawals by Burundi and the Philippines
and the Prosecutor’s unprecedented request for a justification ruling at the ‘pre-preliminary
examination’ stage. This discussion also raises a number of issues worthy of further analysis,
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including: whether the Prosecutor should make a habit of seeking judicial rulings on jurisdictional
questions before a preliminary examination has commenced, whether the Court should give such
opinions and, if so, how transparent its process should be. With 15 years’ worth of practice to draw
on, scholars, practitioners and civil society are now well positioned to engage with this largely
unexamined aspect of the ICC’s work.
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